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Abstract
In this paper we study the impact of reference pricing (RP) on entry of generic firms in
the pharmaceutical market. For given prices, RP increases generic firms’ expected profit,
but since RP also stimulates price competition, the impact on generic entry is theoretically
ambiguous. In order to empirically test the effects of RP, we exploit a policy reform in
Norway in 2005 that exposed a subset of drugs to RP. Having detailed product-level data for
a wide set of substances from 2003 to 2013, we find that RP increased the number of generic
drugs. We also find that RP increased market shares of generic drugs, reduced the prices
of both branded and generic drugs, and led to a (weakly significant) decrease in total drug
expenditures. The reduction in total expenditures was relatively smaller than the reduction
in average prices, reflecting the fact that lower prices stimulated total demand.
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1 Introduction
Reference pricing (RP) of pharmaceuticals has become a widely used regulatory scheme. In
Europe, almost every country has now introduced RP schemes in the market segment for off-
patent drugs.1 In the US, RP is a well-established practice through the Maximum Allowable
Cost (MAC) programmes that are used by Medicaid and some managed-care programmes to
reimburse multisource compounds.2 An RP scheme defines a maximum price that will be reim-
bursed by the insurer for a set of drugs with similar therapeutic effects. Consumers can purchase
a drug priced above the reference price, but will then have to pay out-of-pocket the difference
between the reference price and the actual drug price. The intention of RP is to curb phar-
maceutical expenditures by increasing the demand elasticity and stimulating price competition
between drug producers. In this paper we study whether RP has its intended effects.
RP schemes apply in most cases to substances where the original brand-name drug has
lost patent protection and faces competition from generic versions of the drug.3 Given that
RP enhances price competition between brand-name and generic drug producers, then RP can
in principle have a negative effect on the expected profits of generic drug producers and thus
reduce generic entry.4 If the negative effect on generic entry is sufficiently large, then RP may
in fact dampen price competition and potentially increase pharmaceutical expenditures.5 In the
extreme case where generic entry is fully deterred by the expectation of fierce price competition,
RP would be counterproductive in containing medical costs. Thus, knowledge about the effects
of RP on generic entry has potentially major policy implications.
In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of RP on generic entry and
the corresponding effects on drug prices, sales, and expenditures. To motivate our empirical
analysis, we develop a general theoretical model that allows us to identify the key effects of RP
on generic entry. The theoretical analysis shows that the impact of RP on generic entry depends
1According to Carone et al. (2012) at least 20 member states in the European Union have introduced RP.
2See, for instance, Danzon and Ketcham (2004) or a recent study by Kelton et al. (2014).
3In some countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, RP is applied more broadly including also drugs
with similar therapeutic effects but different substances (see, e.g., Danzon and Ketcham, 2004, or Carone et al.,
2012).
4The idea that potential ex post competition may reduce entry is well illustrated in Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1988).
5Danzon and Chao (2000) was perhaps the first paper to make this argument, but focused mainly on the
effect of direct price regulation on generic competition.
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on the relative strength of two counteracting effects. On the one hand, for given prices, RP
increases the demand for generic drugs due to a higher brand-name copayment, which provides
the generic drug producers with an incentive to set higher prices and in turn makes generic entry
more profitable. On the other hand, RP pushes the brand-name producer to reduce its price to
counteract the (expected) reduction in demand. If the brand-name producer’s price response to
RP is sufficiently aggressive, so that the generic drug producers also reduce their prices, the net
effect on generic entry may be negative. Thus, the impact of RP on generic entry is theoretically
ambiguous and consequently an empirical question.
To estimate the effect of RP on generic entry, we exploit a policy reform in Norway that
introduced an RP scheme called Trinnpris in 2005.6 Importantly, the scheme was gradually
implemented due to administrative reasons and included initially only a limited set of off-patent
substances. This allows us to use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the effect of
RP on generic entry. The effect is identified by selecting a sample of substances which all had
generic competition prior to the policy reform in 2005, and comparing the change in the number
of generic firms for the substances that were exposed to RP with those that were not exposed to
RP. Estimating a fixed-effect model making use of detailed product-level data from 2003 to 2013,
we find that the introduction of RP (i) substantially increased the number of generic producers,
(ii) intensified price competition, resulting in lower prices of both brand-name and generic drugs,
and (iii) increased the market share of generic producers. Thus, our results suggest that RP led
to a demand increase for generic drugs that outweighs the corresponding price reductions, and
therefore stimulated generic entry. We also find a negative effect (albeit weakly significant) of
RP on total drug expenditures. The reduction in total expenditures is relatively smaller than
the average price reduction, which reflects the fact that lower prices stimulate total demand for
pharmaceuticals.
The literature on the effects of RP on pharmaceutical prices, sales, and expenditures is fairly
large.7 The empirical studies tend to find that RP intensifies price competition between brand-
name and generic producers, with the price response being stronger for brand-name drugs than
for generic drugs (see e.g., Pavcnik, 2002, Brekke et al., 2009, 2011, Kaiser et al., 2014). Most
6For details about this scheme, see the website of the Norwegian Medicines Agency;
www.legemiddelverket.no/trinnpris.
7See Galizzi et al. (2011) for a review of the literature on RP in pharmaceutical markets.
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empirical studies also report that the brand-name market share is reduced by the introduction
of RP (see e.g., Aronsson, 2001, Brekke et al. 2011, Kaiser et al., 2014). Despite the findings of
intensified price competition, this literature tends to ignore the effect of RP on generic entry. The
contribution of our study in relation to this literature is two-fold: First, we directly estimate the
impact of RP on generic entry per se. Second, we estimate the effect of RP on market outcomes
explicitly accounting for generic entry. Our results show that RP had a positive effect on generic
entry, and this effect reinforced the direct effect of RP on prices and sales.
Despite the rich empirical literature on generic entry in pharmaceutical markets8, very few
papers investigate the impact of RP on generic entry. Ekelund (2001), Rudholm (2001), and
Moreno-Torres et al. (2009) are, to our knowledge, the only studies that address the relationship
between RP and generic entry.9 Ekelund (2001) and Rudholm (2001) analyse the introduction of
RP in the Swedish pharmaceutical market. Whereas Ekelund (2001) reports a (weak) negative
effect of RP on generic entry, Rudholm (2001) finds no effect of RP.10 A more recent study by
Moreno-Torres et al. (2009) on the Spanish pharmaceutical market finds a negative effect of
RP on generic entry. Our study reports the opposite result, namely that RP stimulated generic
entry. This is due to the fact that the positive demand effect on generic sales more than offset
the negative price effect induced by RP. One possible reason for this result is the presence of
price cap regulation, which weakens the price response by original brand-name producers.11
However, as pointed out above, the impact of RP on generic entry is theoretically ambiguous,
and this may explain different results in different markets. Our study also contributes to the
existing studies in that we exploit the gradual implementation of RP in Norway, which enables
us to estimate the causal effect of RP on generic entry using a difference-in-difference approach.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a general frame-
work to illustrate the main theoretical mechanisms which determine the relationship between
RP and generic entry. In Section 3 we describe the institutional framework of the Norwegian
8See, for instance, Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Frank and Salkever (1997), Scott Morton (1999, 2000),
Reiffen and Ward (2005) for generic entry in the more unregulated US pharmaceutical market, and Rudholm
(2001) and Iizuka (2009) for generic entry in the more regulated Swedish and Japanese markets, respectively.
9There is also a cross-country study by Danzon and Ketcham (2004) on the effects of different RP schemes
on generic competition using one-year cross-sectional data.
10Bergman and Rudholm (2003) also study the impact of RP in Sweden, but focus on the impact of actual
and potential generic competition on pharmaceutical prices.
11Using a Salop-type model, Brekke et al. (2015) find that RP reduces generic entry, but the effect is weaker
and may be reversed in the presence of price regulation.
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pharmaceutical market. In Section 4 we present our data and descriptive statistics. In Section
5 we explain our empirical strategy and report our results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical framework
To motivate our empirical analysis, we present a general theoretical framework for assessing
the impact of different reimbursement schemes on pharmaceutical price setting, which in turn
affect incentives for generic entry. Consider a pharmaceutical market with a brand-name drug
(denoted b) which has lost patent protection and potentially faces competition from generic
producers (denoted g and indexed by i = 1, ..., n) that can enter the market by incurring a fixed
cost f . Without loss of generality, we abstract from other production costs.
Consumers are partially insured and face copayments cb if purchasing the brand-name
drug and cig if purchasing generic drug i. Demand for the two drug versions are given by
Db
(
cb, c
1
g, ..., c
n
g , n
)
and Dig
(
cb, c
1
g, ..., c
n
g , n
)
, with ∂Db/∂cb < 0, ∂Db/∂c
i
g > 0, ∂D
i
g/∂c
i
g < 0,
∂Dig/∂cb > 0, ∂Db/∂n ≤ 0 and ∂Dig/∂n < 0, and where all demand functions for generic drugs
are symmetric. Finally, we assume that Db > D
i
g if cb = c
i
g, implying that (at least some) con-
sumers strictly prefer the brand-name drug over a generic alternative if copayments are identical.
The profits of brand-name and generic producers, respectively, are then given by
pib = pbDb
(
cb, c
1
g, ..., c
n
g , n
)
, (1)
piig = p
i
gD
i
g
(
cb, c
1
g, ..., c
n
g , n
)− f, i = 1, ..., n. (2)
where pb and p
i
g are the prices set by the brand-name producer and generic producer i, re-
spectively. We consider a two-stage game where the generic entry decisions are followed by
simultaneous price setting.
2.1 Fixed percentage reimbursement (FPR)
Suppose first that the copayment is a fixed percentage of the price of the demanded product. If
we let α ∈ (0, 1) be the coinsurance rate, the copayments for the brand-name and the generic
drug i are cFb = αpb and c
F
gi = αp
i
g, respectively. Suppose that n generic firms have entered the
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market. Because of the assumed symmetry among the generic producers, the Nash equilibrium
in the price game has equal prices (and therefore equal demand) for all generic drugs. Let us
denote the equilibrium brand-name and generic prices by pFb and p
F
g , respectively. These prices
are implicitly defined by the following system of equations:12
Db
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
+ cFb
∂Db
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
∂cFb
= 0, (3)
Dg
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
+ cFg
∂Dg
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
∂cFg
= 0. (4)
Defining εj := −∂Dj∂cj
cj
Dj
as the copay-elasticity of demand for drug j, the equilibrium conditions
(3)-(4) imply
εb
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
= εg
(
cFb
(
pFb
)
, cFg
(
pFg
)
, n
)
= 1. (5)
Thus, in equilibrium, each producer will price its drug such that the copay-elasticity of demand
is equal to one. From the second order conditions of profit maximization, it can be shown that
the copay-elasticity of demand is increasing in the price of the drug. Thus, in equilibrium, the
brand-name drug is priced higher than the generic drugs (pFb > p
F
g ), under the assumption that
εb < εg for cb = cg.
13
2.2 Exogenous reference pricing (RP)
Let us now consider a reference pricing scheme where the insurer defines a maximum reim-
bursement r, which is assumed to be exogenous in the sense that it does not depend on the
pricing of the brand-name and generic producers. This is arguably the best approximation to
reimbursement schemes where the reference price is not frequently updated or where updates
are not based on predefined rules.
12Assuming the second-order conditions
∂2pib
∂p2b
= 2α
∂Db
∂cb
+ cb
∂2Db
∂c2b
< 0,
∂2piig
∂
(
pig
)2 = 2α∂Dig∂cg + cig ∂
2Dig
∂
(
cig
)2 < 0, i = 1, ..., n
are fulfilled.
13This assumption is rather mild, since most empirical evidence documents that generics are priced below
brand-name drugs.
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Assuming that the reference price is set such that pig < r < pb, copayments for the brand-
name and the generic drug are given by cRb = αr + pb − r and cRgi = αpig, respectively.14 By
applying this copayment scheme and maximising (1)-(2) with respect to pb and p
i
g, respectively,
we derive the Nash equilibrium in the price game under RP, for a given number (n) of generic
producers. Once more, because of symmetry, all generic prices (and market shares) are equal.
Let us denote the equilibrium brand-name and generic prices by pRb and p
R
g , respectively. These
prices are implicitly given by
Db
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
+ pRb
∂Db
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
∂cRb
= 0 (6)
and
Dg
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
+ cRg
∂Dg
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
∂cRg
= 0. (7)
Using once more the definition of copay-elasticity of demand, the equilibrium prices are such
that
εb
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
= 1− (1− α) r
pRb
< εg
(
cRb
(
pRb
)
, cRg
(
pRg
)
, n
)
= 1. (8)
Thus, in equilibrium prices are set such that the copay-elasticity of demand is lower for brand-
name than for generic drugs.15
2.3 FPR versus RP
Let us now compare equilibrium pricing under the two reimbursement regimes and deduce the
potential implications for generic entry. When comparing the two equilibria, implicitly given by
(5) and (8), notice that cRg (pg) = c
F
g (pg), whereas c
R
b (pb) > c
F
b (pb).
Consider first the pricing of the brand-name drug. Comparing (5) and (8), it is straightfor-
ward to see that RP gives the brand-name producer an incentive to reduce its price, compared
with FPR. For given prices, RP reduces demand for the brand-name drug while simultaneously
making demand more price-elastic. The first effect implies that RP increases the copay-elasticity
of brand-name drug demand, whereas the second effect implies that brand-name profits are max-
14A reference price outside this interval would either imply that there is no difference between FPR and RP
(if r > pb) or that patients are not insured (if r < p
i
g). We consider both of these cases to be irrelevant.
15This does not imply that the brand-name price is lower than generic prices in equilibrium, since, for equal
copayments, the copay-elasticity is lower for brand-name than for generic drugs.
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imised when the copay-elasticity is less than one. Thus, both effects contribute towards a lower
price for the brand-name drug under RP than under FPR.
The price response of generic producers to RP is more ambiguous. On the one hand, RP
reduces the copay-elasticity of generic drug demand for given prices, since cRb (pb) > c
F
b (pb) and
thereforeDRg (pb, pg) > D
F
g (pb, pg), which gives generic producers an incentive to increases prices.
On the other hand, the negative price response to RP by the brand-name producer implies that
cRb
(
pRb
)
< cRb
(
pFb
)
, which has the opposite effect on the copay-elasticity of generic demand and
thus generic pricing. Thus, RP has both a positive direct (demand) effect and a negative indirect
effect (due to prices being strategic complements) on the pricing of generic drugs. The relative
strength of these two counteracting effects determine whether equilibrium generic prices are
higher or lower under RP, compared with FPR. Since equilibrium generic prices imply a copay-
elasticity equal to one under both reimbursement regimes, and since cRg (pg) = c
F
g (pg), the effect
of RP on generic prices depends ultimately on how RP affects the brand-name copayment, and
how this in turn affects the copay-elasticity of generic drug demand. Under the assumption
that the elasticity of demand for generics decreases as the brand-name drug’s price increases,
i.e. ∂εg/∂cb < 0, we can conclude that p
R
g < (>) p
F
g if and only if c
R
b
(
pRb
)
< (>) cFb
(
pFb
)
.16 In
words, if RP implies a lower brand-name copayment in equilibrium, it also implies lower generic
drug prices.
Are incentives for generic entry higher under RP than under FPR? The answer to this
question depends on the equilibrium profit difference (for a given number of generic producers)
under the two reimbursement regimes. This profit difference can be written as
piRg (n)− piFg (n) =
[
DRg −DFg
]
pRg +
[
pRg − pFg
]
DFg . (9)
The first term represents the demand effect, whereas the second term represents the price effect.
Since both effects are a priori ambiguous, we can distinguish between four different scenarios:
16Since
∂εg
∂cb
= − cg
Dg
(
∂2Dg
∂cb∂cg
− ∂Dg
∂cg
∂Dg/∂cb
Dg
)
,
a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for ∂εg/∂cb < 0 is ∂
2Dg/∂cb∂cg ≥ 0.
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1. If pRg > p
F
g and D
R
g > D
F
g , RP unambiguously stimulates generic entry.
2. If pRg > p
F
g and D
R
g < D
F
g , the effect of RP on generic entry is theoretically ambiguous.
3. If pRg < p
F
g and D
R
g > D
F
g , the effect of RP on generic entry is theoretically ambiguous.
4. If pRg < p
F
g and D
R
g < D
F
g , RP unambiguously discourages generic entry.
Since most empirical studies find that RP leads to lower generic prices, we consider the last
two scenarios to be the most likely ones. If so, it follows that a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for RP to stimulate generic entry is that it leads to a lower brand-name market share.
2.4 Price cap regulation
In the above analysis, we have assumed that all drug producers can freely choose their prices.
However, in many countries (including Norway) drug pricing is, to some extent, restricted by
price cap regulation. Let us here briefly consider how the analysis might be affected if a binding
price cap is imposed. Given that generic producers have an incentive to price their drugs below
the brand-name price, the presence of a price cap will potentially bind only for the brand-name
producer. The above described price and demand effects of RP might therefore be modified
in one of the following two ways: (i) if the price cap binds under FPR but not under RP, the
difference in brand-name prices under the two reimbursement regimes will be smaller than in
the absence of price cap regulation, which – all else equal – increases the profitability of RP for
generic producers; (ii) if the price cap binds under both reimbursement regimes, then RP has no
effect on brand-name prices and will unambiguously boost the profitability of generics through
higher demand.
Thus, we expect that the presence of price cap regulation makes it more likely that the
introduction of RP will stimulate demand for generics, thereby making generic entry more
profitable. In a companion paper (Brekke et al., 2015) we develop a full-fledged model of generic
competition in a Salop-type framework and show that the presence of price cap regulation will
indeed increase the scope for RP to stimulate generic entry.
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3 Institutional background
The total sales of pharmaceuticals in Norway are around 20 billion NOK, where prescription
drugs have a market share of around 80 percent.17 As in most other European markets, the
Norwegian pharmaceutical market is subject to regulation.18 On the supply side, prices of
prescription drugs are subject to price cap regulation. The price regulation scheme is based
on international reference pricing (or external referencing), where prices are collected from nine
Western European countries.19 The maximum price of a given drug on the Norwegian market is
set as the average of the three lowest prices of the (original brand-name) product in the reference
countries. Generic drugs obtain the same price cap as the original brand-name product. In
practice, this usually implies that the price cap is binding for the original drug, but not for the
generic drugs. The price caps are usually revised annually, and change depending on the price
development in the reference countries and/or the movements in the exchange rates.
On the demand side, there is cost-sharing of medical expenditures between patients and the
National Insurance Scheme for prescription drugs on the reimbursement list.20 For these drugs,
patients pay a standard coinsurance, which is currently 38 percent of the price of the drug,
constrained by expenditure caps per script and per year.21 If the medical expenditures exceed
these caps, patients receive 100 percent insurance coverage for any additional medical costs.
To increase demand elasticity and curb pharmaceutical expenditures, Norway introduced in
2005 a reference pricing scheme called Trinnpris. This scheme applies to prescription drugs on
the reimbursement list that have lost patent protection and are subject to competition from
generic drugs.22 The reference price, which is the maximum reimbursement from the National
Insurance Scheme, is set as a fixed discount on the price cap of the original brand-name drug
17The total sales of pharmaceuticals were 21.7 billion NOK in 2014, according to the Association of the
Pharmaceutical Industry in Norway (LMI). 1 Euro is about 8 NOK, 1 US dollar is about 7 NOK, and 1 British
pound is about 11 NOK.
18For details about the regulation of the Norwegian pharmaceutical market, see the website of the Norwegian
Medicines Agency; www.legemiddelverket.no.
19The reference countries for Norway are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, and the UK.
20For over-the-counter drugs and prescription drugs not listed for reimbursement, which usually are phar-
maceuticals aimed at treating short-term conditions, the patients have to pay out-of-pocket 100 percent of the
medical costs.
21For 2014 the expenditure caps were NOK 520 per script and NOK 2105 per year.
22In addition, the Norwegian Medicines Agency has to define the original and generic drug versions as substi-
tutable, see www.legemiddelverket.no/bytteliste.
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in the period prior to patent expiration and generic entry. The initial discount is 35 percent
and effective when generic competition takes place. After six months the discount is increased
to around 60 or 80 percent depending on the sales value of the drug. Eventually, after (at
least) 18 months the regulator can increase the discount up to a maximum of 90 percent for the
substances with the highest sales value.23
Patients who purchase a product that is priced higher than the reference price have to pay
the full price difference out-of-pocket in addition to the standard coinsurance payment. Notably,
this part of the patients’ copayments have to be paid irrespectively of whether the accumulated
medical costs exceed the expenditure caps described above. Moreover, pharmacies are through
the generic substitution law obliged to offer patients lower priced (generic) products.24 If patients
refuses to accept the generic substitute, then they are charged the price difference between the
actual price of the product and the reference price.
The Trinnpris scheme, which was effective from 1st of January 2005, was announced by the
government in May 2004 and later approved by the Norwegian Parliament in October 2004.
However, the implementation of the RP scheme was gradual and applied only to a subsample
of off-patent substances. This was mainly due to practical reasons and the administrative
workload related to implementing reference prices for the relevant products, but also to gain
some experience before extending the scheme to more substances.25 Thus, from 1 January 2005
the Norwegian Medicines Agency included only 20 off-patent substances that had lost patent
protection and faced competition from generic drugs.26 The scheme has been gradually extended
and includes now more than 100 substances. In the next section, we will describe our sample of
substances more carefully.
23For more details see the webpage of the Norwegian Medicines Agency www.legemiddelverket.no.
24The pharmacies are obliged to have at least one drug version priced at (or below) the RP (trinnpris) available
for sale.
25Details about this can be found in the hearing document from the Norwegian Ministry of Health dated
October 6, 2014; https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/horing–trinnpris-for-visse-legemidler/id96490/
26For the list of substances subject to Trinnpris, with details about when they were included, see
www.legemiddelverket.no/trinnpris.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
To study the effects of RP on the entry of generic products and, in turn, on pricing and sales
of pharmaceuticals, we have collected information about generic entry, pricing and sales of the
222 best selling molecules from the database of the Norwegian Pharmacy Association. The data
contains detailed sales information of all transactions (purchases) made at every pharmacy in
Norway.27 We could retrieve monthly information about sales revenues and volumes (number of
packs and defined daily doses (DDDs)) for all products over the eleven year period 2003-2013.
The data also contains information about substance name, producer (seller), pack size, dosage
strength, whether the drug is branded or generic, etc.
Using the information about actual generic sales in our data, we can identify the date of
entry (or exit) of generic products for each molecule in our sample. The data also allows us to
measure the intensity of generic competition, as we can observe the number of generic products
with positive sales at each date during the sample period. By dividing sales revenues by sales
volumes measured in DDDs, we obtain a monthly (sales-)weighted average price per DDD of the
brand-name and generic drugs for each month, which enables us to study the price responses
to the implementation of RP. Information about the date for inclusion of a molecule in the RP
scheme is obtained from the Norwegian Medicines Agency.
In our analysis, each market (i.e., molecule) includes all products using the same active
ingredient, identified by a unique Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) code. We only
include markets with generic competition before the reform was announced, in May 2004, and
exclude all observations prior to the first recorded generic entry. This allows us to exclude
molecules potentially under patent protection. In absence of reliable patent data, our study
focuses on the effect of RP on generic competition at the intensive margin, i.e., intensity of
generic competition, rather than at the extensive margin, i.e., probability of generic entry. We
dropped 7 molecules that were subject to a policy experiment with a different RP scheme from
2003 to 2005.28 Moreover, we dropped all non-tablets products. The reason to focus on tablets
27Sales that are channeled through the hospitals to hospitalised patients and over-the-counter drugs sales
taking place outside pharmacies (at, say, grocery stores) are not covered by this database. For more details, see
the website of the Norwegian Pharmacy Association; www.apotek.no.
28Under this scheme, called Indekspris, the reference price was set as a weighted average of brand-name and
generic prices. For more details, see Brekke et al. (2009, 2011).
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only is twofold. First, no molecules commercialised in non-tablet form only have been subject to
RP during our sample period. Second, focusing on tablets only ensures that the market defined
by each molecule includes comparable products. Within the same molecule one can have non-
tablet and tablet products, and they may not be substitutable. We are left with an unbalanced
panel of 36 molecules for a total of 4,576 month-molecule observations over the period 2003-2013.
Of the 36 molecules in our sample, 19 were subject to RP in some periods after the reform was
introduced, in January 2005. This group will be our treatment group. Conversely, 17 molecules
were never subject to RP, and they will constitute our control group.
In Table 1, we report the mean and the standard deviations of the dependent variables in
our empirical models, for drugs with generic competition. Figures 2-8 in the Appendix display
the development over time of the variables of interest. For drugs subject to RP, we calculate
these measures for the periods before and after these drugs were included in the RP scheme. For
drugs never subject to RP, we calculate averages before and after the reform was introduced,
in 2005, in order to provide some comparison. The drugs in the treatment group display an
increase in the number of generics present on the market after the introduction of RP (from 1.9
to 2.5 per market). For drugs in the control group, the number of generics decreased over time
(from 2.5 to 1.7). A more detailed description of generic competition is reported in Table 2,
where the information is disaggregated by market.
According to Table 1, drug prices in the treatment group before the introduction of RP
are relatively high compared with the ones in the control group. Similarly, the markets in
the treatment group are characterised by higher sales and higher originator’s market shares.
Thus, there is some evidence that the regulator included in the RP scheme larger markets with
higher prices. However, as Figures 4-7 suggest, the trend in market shares, average prices, and
revenues were not substantially different in the treatment and control groups before the reform
was announced.29 The average price for treated drugs decreases after the introduction of RP,
whereas the average price of drugs in the control group does not decline substantially over time.
A similar pattern can be found for the market shares of the originator.
29Figure 5 registers a large upward jump in the treatment group average prices in March 2004. This is due
to the fact that at this date Fluconazole, an antifungal drug displaying a very high price per DDD, is included
in the sample due to the first generic entering the market. Figure 6 reports average prices when Fluconazole is
excluded from the sample. All our results are robust to the exclusion of this drug from the sample.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Table 2 here]
5 Empirical strategy and results
Our aim is to test for the effect of RP on the number of generic products in the market.
As mentioned above, we limit our analysis to markets with generic competition prior to the
announcement of the RP reform. Thus, our estimates of the effect of RP are conditional on
competition being already present in the market. As discussed in Section 2, a necessary condition
for RP to stimulate generic entry in the case where RP leads to lower generic prices, is that
demand shifts away from the originator. For this reason, we also test the effect of RP on market
shares and on market prices.
Our empirical strategy relies on a comparison of the molecules affected by RP (treatment
group) to similar molecules that were never subject to RP (control group). Since the RP scheme
was implemented gradually, as described in Section 3, the effect of the regulatory change can be
evaluated with a difference-in-difference approach. Because of the panel structure of the data,
we can compare inter-temporal variation in the number of generic competitors before and after
the imposition of the reform for each molecule. The identification does not only rely on a before
and after comparison, but also on a comparison of variations in the number of generic products
for molecules subject to RP with variation in outcomes for molecules not subject to this reform.
The model to be estimated is
Yit = βXit + ρDit + δt + ai + it, (10)
where Yit is the variable of interest (i.e., number of generics, prices, sales, or market shares)
at time t in market i. Dit is a dummy variable equal to one if molecule i is subject to RP
at time t, and the vector Xit contains observed time-varying characteristics. In the baseline
model these include the number of therapeutic substitutes in the same ATC3 group and market
size (captured by the log of sales revenues of all the product in the therapeutic group). ai
is a molecule fixed effect, whereas δt is a month-specific effect common to all molecules. The
coefficient of interest is ρ, which captures the effect of RP.
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5.1 Pre-reform test
For our approach to be valid in identifying the causal effect of RP on generic entry, the treatment
and the control group need to be comparable. While differences in characteristics that are
constant over time can be controlled for by fixed effects, systematic differences in trends in the
pre-reform period are more problematic. In other words, for our parameter ρ to estimate causal
effects, the trend of the number of generic products before the introduction of RP should be
similar in the treatment and control group. We cannot implement the usual pre-reform tests,
due to the fact that RP is introduced at different points in time to the molecules in the treatment
group. However, we run the test on the period before the reform was announced, in May 2004.
By that point, the producers of molecules soon to be included in the RP scheme could have
been already informed (at least informally).30
The average numbers of generics for the control and the treatment group in the pre-reform
period are plotted in Figure 1. The figure suggests that the evolutions in the number of generics
are fairly similar across the two groups in the pre-reform period. To test our assumption of
common trends, we also run a fixed effects regression where the dependent variable is the number
of generics. We only consider pre-reform observations (January 2003-May 2004) and we include
interactions between monthly dummies and a dummy indicating treated molecules. If these
interactions do not have a significant coefficient, this indicates that pre-reform trends are not
significantly different, and that the control group is legitimate. The results of the test are
presented in Table 3. All interactions are non-significant, both individually and jointly.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
5.2 Effects of RP on generic entry
The main results on generic entry are reported in the first column of Table 4. The number of
generics in a given market is significantly higher after the introduction of RP. The effect (1.4)
is quite high if compared with the average number of entrants in the pre-reform period (1.6).
As our descriptive statistics and Figure 2 in the Appendix illustrate, this positive and strongly
30Of the 19 molecules in the treatment group, 14 were included in the RP scheme already in 2005, while 5
were included later on.
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significant effect is mostly due to a decline in the number of generics for molecules in the control
group, which was much less pronounced for drugs in the treatment group. The decline in generic
competition seems to be pervasive in the Norwegian pharmaceutical market, as is evident from
Figure 3 in the Appendix, which shows the average number of generics for all tablets markets
with some generic competition present in our sample. Thus, our finding suggests that, for the
treated markets, the introduction of RP has slowed down, and to some extent reversed, an
otherwise downward trend in the number of generics.
In order to be consistent with our pre-reform test, we also consider the possibility that
producers may be informed early about the inclusion in the RP scheme. Thus, we define a
different treatment dummy, taking the value one in all periods with RP and in the 7 months
prior to the inclusion of the drug in the RP scheme. The results, presented in column (2) of
Table 2, indicate that our parameter of interest is robust to this alternative specification. The
estimated effect of RP is slightly lower in this case, suggesting that entry decisions are responsive
to the expected inclusion of the drug in the RP scheme.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Our results are robust to different model specifications. First, since the number of generics is
a count variable, we run a Poisson regression. The results, reported in the first column of Table
5, are quantitatively similar to the linear ones. Second, to check whether the results are specific
to tablets, we also run both the linear and the Poisson regressions on the full set of products,
including non-tablets. In this case, the treatment group is the same as in our main sample, but
the control group is now larger, including 29 molecules. Again, the main results, reported in the
second and third column of Table 5, are confirmed, and the coefficient of interest has a similar
magnitude.
Controlling for RP inclusion, we do not find any significant effect of the number of therapeutic
substitutes and of the market size (captured by market revenues) on the number of generics in
each market. While this is somehow surprising, if compared with the previous literature (see
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, and Scott-Morton, 1999 and 2000), it is probably due to the fact
that these variables display little variation over time. The effects of molecule-specific market
conditions may thus be captured by the fixed effects.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
All in all, our results suggest that RP had a positive impact on the number of generics. More
specifically, it seems to have countered a downward trend detectable in the control group and
more generally in the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. In light of these results, we expect the
profits of the originator to decline, and the joint profits of generic producers to increase, once we
control for the number of generics in the market. If this was not the case, it would be difficult
to explain the positive effect of RP on generic entry. In Table 6, we explore the effect of RP
on profits. Our measure of profitability is given by the sales of brand-name drugs and generics
(expressed in logarithms). We assume that the variable costs of producing all drugs have not
changed over time, so that sales revenues can be interpreted as a proxy for profits. As expected,
the profits of the originators are negatively affected by RP. The coefficient is very high, 85%,
even when controlling for the number of generics. The joint profits of generic producers are
positively affected by RP (the increase equals 185%), for a given number of generics present in
the market. This is direct evidence of the fact that expected profits are higher in markets with
RP, implying that RP stimulates generic entry.
These findings are consistent with a decline in prices and in the market shares of the originator
for molecules with RP, which is supported by our descriptive statistics. In the next section we
further explore the impact of RP on market shares and prices.
[Insert Table 6 here]
5.3 Effects of RP on market shares and prices
Based on our main result reported above, that RP increases the number of generics, we expect
RP to affect negatively the market share of brand-name drugs. Theoretically, the effect of RP on
brand-name prices is unambiguously negative, whereas the effect on generic prices is ambiguous.
Below we explore these two issues by analysing the effect of RP on market shares and prices. We
estimate two groups of models similar to the previous one, but where the dependent variables
are market shares and prices, respectively.
The results on the effect of RP on the originator’s market share are presented in Table
7. In columns (1) and (2) we do not control for the number of generics, and we find that
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the introduction of RP reduces the market shares of the originators by 37 percentage points
(35 points if we lag the introduction of RP to take announcement effects into account). This
coefficient is statistically and economically significant. However, it may capture two effects. On
the one hand, RP shifts demand from the brand-name drugs to generics, and this may lead to a
reduction in brand-name market shares for a given number of generics. On the other hand, we
have previously shown that RP also encourages generic entry, and this may also have a negative
effect on the originators’ market shares. In order to disentangle these two effects, in columns (3)
and (4) we control for the number of generics. Not surprisingly, the coefficient is negative and
significant. In line with our economic intuition, controlling for the number of generics reduces
the estimated coefficient for the RP dummy. This result is comparable with the one of the
literature, that takes the number of generics as given in assessing the impact of RP.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We now turn to analysing the effect of RP on prices. The results for the price model, for
both brand-name drugs and generics, are presented in Table 8. The dependent variables are
logged prices, so that the coefficients can be interpreted in terms or relative changes. In columns
(1) and (4) we do not control for the number of generics. The estimated effect of RP on prices
is negative for both the brand-name drugs (an estimated 32% reduction) and generics products
(an estimated 42% reduction). The fact that generic prices drop more than the prices of brand-
name drugs does not imply that the decline for generics is higher in absolute terms, since generics
typically have lower prices. In columns (2) and (5), we control for the number of generics on the
market. We do not find a significant coefficient associated with this variable, and the estimated
effect of RP on prices does not seem to be strongly affected by its inclusion in the regression.
In columns (3) and (5), we use the dummy associated with the announcement of RP. The
estimated effect of RP is slightly lower in this specification. Differently from entry decisions,
price adjustments seem to be implemented once the new regulation and thus de fact competition
are in place, rather than at the time of the policy announcement.31
In Table 9, we present estimates on the effect of RP on (sales-weighted) average prices. Not
surprisingly, the effect is negative. This is due both to the shift in demand towards cheaper
31This result is consistent with Bergman and Rudholm (2003) who find that the effect of RP has an impact
on drug prices only when actual (not potential) generic competition occurs.
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generic drugs, and to price responses of both brand-name and generic firms.
[Insert Table 8 here]
[Insert Table 9 here]
The empirical evidence described above allows us to better interpret the evidence on generic
entry. RP leads to lower prices but higher demand for generic drugs. Thus, RP shifts demand
from brand-name to generic drugs, even after prices have been adjusted. This is a necessary
condition for RP to encourage entry in the case where RP leads to lower generic prices. Indeed,
our results on the effect of RP on generic entry show that the positive demand effect is sufficiently
large to outweigh the negative price effect. Even if post-RP prices are lower, the expected profit
of selling a generic drug increases because of the demand effect.
5.4 Effects of RP on expenditures
In the previous sections, we have shown that RP reduces prices, and shifts demands towards
generics. Overall, the effect on generic entry is positive. We now turn to analysing the effect of
RP on total pharmaceutical expenditures (borne both by the government and by consumers).
The effect on expenditures is a priori ambiguous: since prices have been reduced for molecules
with RP, demand might have increased, thus offsetting potential savings.
Our measure of expenditures are the logarithmic transformations of total sales (prices mul-
tiplied by volumes) of all drugs in the therapeutic group. Table 10 summarises the results.
We find a negative effect (statistically significant at the 10% confidence level) of RP on overall
expenditures. This is in line with previous literature, showing that RP is successful in curbing
pharmaceutical expenditures. However, the reduction in total expenditures (24%) is relatively
smaller than the reduction in average prices (50%), which reflects the fact that lower prices stim-
ulate demand. As reported in Table 11, RP is associated with an increase in the total volume
of drugs sold (in DDDs). The increase is non-negligible, amounting to approximately 30%.
[Insert Table 10 here]
[Insert Table 11 here]
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6 Conclusion
This paper constitutes an attempt to assess the effect of RP on the number of generics and
ultimately on prices. Theoretically, the effect of RP on generic entry is ambiguous and depends
on the relative strength of two opposing effects. Whereas RP shifts demand towards generic
drugs for given drug prices, which (all else equal) stimulates generic entry, RP also induces the
brand-name producer to reduce its price, which has the opposite effect on the profitability of
selling generic drugs.
Using Norwegian data, we compare drugs subject and not subject to RP, and find that the
introduction of an RP scheme had a positive effect on the number of generic products present
in the market. Although RP led to lower prices for all drugs, the positive effect on demand
for generic drugs was sufficiently large to stimulate generic entry. Thus, our results suggest
that focusing on short-term price responses to RP might lead to an underestimation of the pro-
competitive effects of RP, since the initial price reductions caused by RP (for a given number
of generics) were reinforced by increased generic entry. Our empirical results also show that the
price reductions caused by RP contributed to a reduction in overall drug expenditures (although
the effect is only weakly significant). Nevertheless, since lower prices stimulated total demand,
the reduction in overall expenditures is much smaller than the price reduction (in relative terms).
One important limitation of our study is that we only consider generic entry/exit in markets
where generic competition is already present. An interesting line of future research would be to
include in the analysis all off-patent drugs, in order to look at the effect of RP on the probability
and lags of entry. To this purpose, detailed patent data would be needed.
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Appendix
[Insert Figures 2-8 here]
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis)
VARIABLES RP. Before RP. During No RP. Before 2005 No RP. After 2005
Number
of generics 1.855 (1.859) 2.497 (1.269 ) 2.486 (2.030) 1.692 (1.699)
Average
Price 12.3605 (18.981) 7.714 (12.432) 5.440 (3.698) 4.561 (3.044)
Market shares
of the originator .724 (.285) .391 (.213 ) .665 (.356) .694 (.367)
Revenues
(in mill. NOK/month) 5.715 (5.189) 2.153 (2.332 ) 1.551 (1.294) 1.467 (1.571)
Number
of markets 19 19 17 17
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Table 2: Sample characteristics: number of generics
ATC-code Molecule Reference Mean Standard min Max Number of
Name Pricing Deviation Obs.
A02BA02 Ranitidine Yes 2.947 1.923 1 7 132
A02BA03 Famotidine No 1.333 .473 1 2 132
A03FA01 Metoclopramide No 1.118 .587 0 2 68
C03CA01 Furosemide No 2.902 1.097 1 4 132
C03EA01 Hydrochorothiazide No .457 .546 0 2 127
C07AB02 Metoprolol Yes 1.091 .337 0 2 132
C07AB03 Atenolol Yes 3.909 2.540 1 9 132
C08CA02 Felodipine Yes 3.024 1.236 0 5 126
C08CA05 Nifedipine No .083 .277 0 1 132
C08DA01 Verapamil No .115 .320 0 1 131
C09AA05 Ramipril Yes 2.444 .875 1 4 117
C09BA02 Enalapril & diur. Yes 1.826 .715 1 3 132
C09BA03 Lisinopril & diur. Yes 2.138 1.368 0 4 130
C09CA03 Valsartan Yes .692 .868 0 2 120
C10AA02 Lovastatin No 1.218 .414 1 2 124
J01CE02 Phenoxymethylpenicillin No 1.977 .150 1 2 132
J01FA09 Clarithromycin Yes 1.582 .641 0 3 122
J01MA02 Ciprofloxacin Yes 3.250 1.333 1 5 132
J02AC01 Fluconazole Yes 2.008 .768 1 3 118
L02BA01 Tamoxifen No .598 .719 0 2 132
M01AB05 Diclofenac Yes 3.083 .277 3 4 132
M01AC01 Piroxicam No 3.886 1.288 2 6 132
M01AE02 Naproxen No 5.212 1.483 2 8 132
M05BA04 Alendronic acid Yes 2.932 1.871 0 6 118
N02AX02 Tramadol No 4.583 1.146 3 7 132
N05AH02 Clozapine Yes 1.811 .554 1 3 132
N05AH03 Olanzapine Yes 1.585 1.469 0 5 118
N05BA12 Alprazolam No .200 .402 0 1 125
N05CD02 Nitrazepam No 1.008 .087 1 2 132
N05CF01 Zopiclone Yes 2.629 .976 2 5 132
N05CF02 Zolpidem No 1.288 .648 1 3 132
N06AB03 Fluoxetine Yes 3.144 .743 1 5 132
N06AB05 Paroxetine Yes 2.938 1.102 0 5 129
N06AX03 Mianserin Yes .697 .461 0 1 132
R03AC02 Salbutamol No 3.886 .519 3 5 132
R03AC13 Formoterol No .788 .410 0 1 132
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Table 3: Pre-reform test, fixed effects with model with robust standard error.
Number of generics
Interaction 1 -.386 (.429)
Interaction 2 -.311 (.409)
Interaction 3 .085 (.310)
Interaction 4 -.213 (.310)
Interaction 5 -.214 (.344)
Interaction 6 -.219 (.344)
Interaction 7 -.064 (.314)
Interaction 8 -.045 (.313)
Interaction 9 .021 (.262)
Interaction 10 .082 (.192)
Interaction 11 -.016 (.303)
Interaction 12 .118 (.233)
Interaction 13 .228 (.221)
Interaction 14 .160 (.184)
Interaction 15 .115 (.166)
Number of terapeutic substitutes -.134 (.248)
Log Revenues -.050 (.190)
Joint Significance (Ftest) .5551
Time dummies Yes
Molecule dummies Yes
Number of markets 36
Observations 465
R2 .059
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Table 4: Estimated effects of reference pricing on the number of generics. Fixed effect models
(1) (2)
Reference Pricing 1.245***
(0.427)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged 1.330***
(0.372)
Number of therapeutic substitutes -0.218 -0.235
(0.218) (0.218)
LogRevenues -0.005 -0.034
(0.183) (0.192)
Constant 4.403 4.935
(2.730) (2.930)
Observations 4,576 4,576
R2 0.175 0.177
Time dummies Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Estimated effects of reference pricing on the number of generics. Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson All Molecules All Molecules
Regression Poisson reg.
Reference Pricing 0.627*** 1.120** 0.501**
(0.215) (0.503) (0.208)
Number of therapeutic substitutes -0.049 -0.298 -0.112
(0.097) (0.284) (0.099)
LogRevenues 0.072 0.185 0.142
(0.123) (0.317) (0.126)
Constant 2.402
(5.356)
Observations 4,576 6,224 6,224
R2 0.102
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 48 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Estimated effects of reference pricing on profits. Fixed effect models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Originator Originator Generics Generics
Reference Pricing -0.851*** 1.836*
(0.206) (0.982)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged -0.734*** 2.158*
(0.191) (1.139)
Number of therapeutic substitutes 0.046 0.046 -0.344 -0.380
(0.123) (0.123) (0.290) (0.305)
Number of generics -0.102** -0.112** 0.242*** 0.244***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.065) (0.064)
Constant 13.09*** 13.05*** 14.35*** 14.59***
(1.105) (1.098) (2.547) (2.674)
Observations 4,484 4,484 3,845 3,845
R2 0.442 0.422 0.198 0.212
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Estimated effects of reference pricing on the originator’s market shares. Fixed effect
models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reference Pricing -0.371*** -0.313***
(0.071) (0.066)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged -0.350*** -0.285***
(0.068) (0.065)
Number of therapeutic substitutes 0.032 0.034 0.024 0.025
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
LogRevenues -0.039 -0.025 -0.041 -0.029
(0.039) (0.045) (0.035) (0.040)
Number of generics -0.051*** -0.053***
(0.010) (0.011)
Constant 1.064* 0.843 1.287** 1.110*
(0.603) (0.680) (0.573) (0.629)
Observations 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376
R2 0.429 0.383 0.498 0.459
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Estimated effects of reference pricing on prices (logged). Fixed effect models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Originator Originator Originator Generics Generics Generics
Reference Pricing -0.322*** -0.306*** -0.421*** -0.417***
(0.065) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071)
Ref. Pricing, 7 month lagged -0.234*** -0.320***
(0.075) (0.078)
N. of therapeutic substitutes 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.048 0.046 0.047
(0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)
Number of generics -0.0141 -0.0198 -0.00644 -0.0120
(0.0185) (0.0219) (0.0137) (0.0163)
Constant 1.711*** 1.765*** 1.791*** 1.327*** 1.358*** 1.365***
(0.265) (0.291) (0.325) (0.270) (0.292) (0.323)
Observations 4,374 4,374 4,374 3,850 3,850 3,850
R2 0.518 0.521 0.480 0.481 0.481 0.424
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36 36 36 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Estimated effects of reference pricing on average prices (logged). Fixed effect models
(1) (2)
Reference Pricing -0.498***
(0.069)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged -0.413***
(0.073)
Number of therapeutic substitutes 0.023 0.022
(0.026) (0.031)
Number of generics -0.036** -0.044*
(0.017) (0.022)
Constant 1.706*** 1.726***
(0.227) (0.276)
Observations 4,576 4,576
R2 0.700 0.638
Time dummies Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Estimated effects of reference pricing on expenditures (logged). Fixed effect models
(1) (2)
Reference Pricing -0.237*
(0.137)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged -0.171
(0.123)
Number of therapeutic substitutes 0.012 0.010
(0.065) (0.067)
Number of generics -0.001 -0.006
(0.034) (0.036)
Constant 14.16*** 14.18***
(0.566) (0.579)
Observations 4,576 4,576
R2 0.324 0.318
Time dummies Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Estimated effects of reference pricing on volumes (measured in DDD, logged). Fixed
effect models
(1) (2)
Reference Pricing 0.282**
(0.121)
Reference Pricing, 7 month lagged 0.268**
(0.113)
Number of therapeutic substitutes -0.020 -0.022
(0.060) (0.061)
Number of generics 0.035 0.036
(0.033) (0.034)
Constant 12.72*** 12.44***
(0.530) (0.557)
Observations 4,686 4,686
R2 0.165 0.160
Time dummies Yes Yes
Molecule dummies Yes Yes
Number of markets 36 36
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Average number of generics. Pre-reform development for substances subject to refer-
ence pricing (RP) and not subject to reference pricing (CR)
34
Figure 2: Average number of generics. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP) and not
subject to reference pricing (CR)
Figure 3: Average number of generics. All tablets (87 markets), conditional on generic compe-
tition
35
Figure 4: Average market shares of the originator. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP)
and not subject to reference pricing (CR)
Figure 5: Average prices. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP) and not subject to
reference pricing (CR)
36
Figure 6: Average prices. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP) and not subject to
reference pricing (CR), excluding Fluconazole
Figure 7: Average revenues. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP) and not subject to
reference pricing (CR)
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Figure 8: Average volumes, in DDD. Substances subject to reference pricing (RP) and not
subject to reference pricing (CR)
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